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“We will turn a sharp eye to those instances where the record
makes it evident that the decision to receive expert testimony was
simply tossed off to the jury under a ‘let it all in’ philosophy.”1 
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2012, a frightened mother rushed her 13-month-old baby,
Landon Lee, to Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center (OLOL)
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana when he began struggling to breathe and
vomiting.2 Emergency room physicians determined that Landon’s
symptoms were heart-related and transferred him to OLOL’s Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit.3 As Landon’s condition worsened, OLOL physicians
decided to transfer him by helicopter to Ochsner Medical Center in the
1. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1233–34 
(5th Cir. 1986).
2. Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 3d 13, 14 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
3. Id.
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ECMO4 unit.5 Landon died shortly after arriving at Ochsner due to an 
enlarged heart.6 After receiving the medical review panel’s decision,7 
Landon’s mother, Anjel Lee, filed a medical malpractice claim against
OLOL and Dr. Boudreaux, the emergency room physician who treated
Landon at OLOL.8 Lee’s case illustrates the fatal or severe injuries that are
often associated with a medical malpractice claim, making the court’s
determination on the claim a crucial one.9 
Medical malpractice claims are among Louisiana’s most frequently
litigated lawsuits.10 In Louisiana, plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice
bear the often challenging burden of establishing the defendant healthcare
provider’s standard of care and proving that there was a breach of that
standard of care.11 To meet this burden of proof, plaintiffs must present
expert witness testimony, unless a defendant healthcare provider’s
negligence is obvious to a lay jury.12 The outcome of a medical
4. See Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation, MEDLINE PLUS, https://
medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007234.htm [https://perma.cc/B8UH-TJQ6] (last
visited Apr. 12, 2021) (“Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is a
treatment that uses a pump to circulate blood through an artificial lung back into
the bloodstream of a very ill baby. This system provides heart-lung bypass support
outside of the baby’s body.”).
5. Lee, 229 So. 3d at 14.
6. Id.
7. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8 (2019). A medical review panel, made up of
three health care providers and a non-voting attorney, issues an “expert opinion
as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or
defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate standards of care.” Id.; see 
also Sarah M. Nickel, The Medical Malpractice Cure: Stitching Together the
Coleman Factors, 78 LA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2017). An action for medical
malpractice cannot be commenced prior to a claimant’s presentation of his or her
proposed complaint to a medical review panel. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(B).
8. Lee, 229 So. 3d at 14.
9. See, e.g., id.
10. See Natalie J. Dekaris & Michael C. Mims, Recent Developments:
Louisiana Medical Malpractice, 74 LA. L. REV. 873, 873 (2014); see also Ralph
Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps on
Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 710–12
(2005) (noting that a medical malpractice case generally costs $50,000, at
minimum, to prepare).
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
12. See Schultz v. Guoth, 57 So. 3d 1002 (La. 2011); see also Pfiffner v.
Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994) (“Expert testimony is not required
where the physician does an obviously careless act, such as fracturing a leg during
examination, amputating the wrong arm, dropping a knife, scalpel, or acid on a
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  372 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
  




   
    
  
 
       
    
   
     
  
     









     
 
   
   
    
  
    
 
    
    
   
       
    
      
   
    
      
      
   
1480 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
malpractice action, thus, is contingent upon credible expert witness 
testimony.13 Louisiana courts, however, struggle to classify the scope of
persons able to qualify as expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases.14 
Specifically, Louisiana courts disagree as to whether a potential expert
witness practicing in a different area of medicine than the defendant is
qualified to provide expert testimony on the applicable standard of care
and on whether a breach of that standard of care occurred.15 Indeed, expert
witness testimony is vital to a litigant’s success in a medical malpractice
lawsuit, such as Landon’s case; thus, the Louisiana Legislature must
provide clear standards to govern expert witness qualification.16 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794 sets forth the standards governing
whether a potential witness is qualified to testify as an expert in a medical
malpractice action.17 Section 9:2794(D)(1) provides a broad standard that
an individual may serve as an expert witness if “he is qualified on the basis
of training or experience to offer an expert opinion” concerning the
standard of care.18 To determine whether a witness is “qualified on the
basis of training or experience,” § 9:2794(D)(3) states that the court “shall
consider whether . . . the witness is board certified or has other substantial
training in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim and is actively 
practicing in that area.”19 
Louisiana courts continue to inconsistently interpret the broad 
language in § 9:2794(D).20 In some cases, courts adopt a liberal approach
patient, or leaving a sponge in a patient’s body, from which a lay person can infer
negligence.”).
13. See Schultz, 57 So. 3d 1002; see also Riser v. Am. Med. Intern., Inc., 620
So. 2d 372, 382 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the trial court’s decision 
to credit and adopt the testimony of one medical expert over another equally
qualified expert was not manifestly erroneous).
14. See generally Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2018); Lee, 229 So. 3d at 18.
15. See Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64 (allowing a board-certified general
surgeon to testify, as an expert, regarding the standard of care applicable to an
orthopedic surgeon, hospitalists, and a nurse practitioner). But see Lee, 229 So.
2d at 18 (holding that a board-certified pediatric cardiologist was not qualified to
offer an opinion as to the standard of care owed by an emergency room physician).
16. See generally Schultz, 57 So. 3d at 1006–07; Morris v. Rainwater, 218
So. 3d 226, 235 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
17. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See Pertuit v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 170 So. 3d 1106,
1110 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015). But see Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La.,
L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015).
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2021] COMMENT 1481
to qualify an expert witness “on the basis of training or experience”
without considering whether that witness is “actively practicing” in an area
of medicine “relevant to the claim.”21 In direct contravention of the statute,
these courts admit expert witness testimony from a healthcare provider
who practices in a different area of medicine than the defendant.22 
Conversely, other courts take a literal approach to § 9:2794’s requirement
that the witness is “actively practicing” in an area of medicine “relevant to
the claim” and hold that an expert witness must practice in the defendant’s 
same field of medicine.23 Medical malpractice litigants, therefore, practice
with unpredictability and ambiguity because courts continue to apply
different standards.24 The Louisiana Legislature must revise § 9:2794, 
because courts will continually depart from the statute and embrace a “‘let
it all in’ philosophy.”25 
To resolve the current inconsistency, the Louisiana Legislature should
amend § 9:2794(D)(3) to require that the witness actively practice in the
same field of medicine as the defendant healthcare provider.26 Instead of
21. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3); see Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So.
3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014) (allowing a neurologist to testify as
to the standard of care of an internist); Thompson v. Ctr. for Pediatric &
Adolescent Med., L.L.C., 224 So. 3d 441 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018) (holding
that a board-certified pediatrician could testify as to the standard of care
applicable to a nurse practitioner).
22. See Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85.
23. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3); see Harper, 86 So. 3d at 696 (allowing a 
general surgeon to offer expert testimony concerning the standard of care
applicable to a radiologist); Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85 (allowing a neurologist
to testify as to the standard of care of an internist). But see Lee v. Quinn, 229 So.
2d 13, 18 (La. App. Ct. 1st Cir. 2017) (excluding testimony of a pediatric
cardiologist regarding the standard of care to be exercised by an emergency room
physician); Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31–32 (holding that a board-certified expert in
cardiology was not qualified to offer an expert opinion regarding the standard of
care applicable to a hospitalist).
24. See Primeaux v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 862 So. 2d 496, 503 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003) (“When the alleged negligence of a specialist is at issue,
only those qualified in that specialty may offer expert testimony and evidence of
the applicable standard of care.”). But see Pertuit, 170 So. 3d at 1110 (“R.S. 
9:2794 has no absolute requirement that a proffered expert must practice in the
same specialty as the defendant.”).
25. See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1233– 
34 (5th Cir. 1986); see also LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794.
26. See Pertuit, 170 So. 3d at 1110. But see Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31; Steib v.
Waguespack, 168 So. 3d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014) (“Where the
defendant practices in a particular specialty and the alleged acts of medical
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  374 5/26/21  11:50 AM





   
    
  
  
     
   
  
    
 
  
   
     
  
   
    
     
   
   
 
   
  
      
      
   
     
        
  
      
   
  
 
    
     
  
 
     




   
    
1482 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
providing that courts “shall consider” whether the witness is “actively
practicing” in an area of “medical practice relevant to the claim,” the 
statute should contain an explicit requirement that the witness’s field of
medical practice match the defendant’s.27 The legislature should replace
the words “substantial training or experience” with language that the court
shall consider “as the deciding factor . . . whether the witness is actively
practicing in, or has within five years prior to the date of the alleged
malpractice actively practiced in, the same field of medical practice as the
defendant healthcare provider.”28 This revision will reduce litigation
concerning expert witness qualification, allow litigants to instead focus on
the merits of the case at hand, and provide consistency among the courts.29 
Because § (D)(1) requires the witness to be a practicing physician in good
standing,30 the proposed legislative revision guarantees that judges will 
base their rulings on whether the witness has within five years prior to the
alleged malpractice actively practiced in the defendant’s field of medicine
or is actively practicing in that field.31 Further, this revision balances the
interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.32 Defendant healthcare
providers facing medical malpractice claims will no longer incur liability
based on testimony from an expert who has never practiced in the
negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty involved,” the
plaintiff must prove the standard of care of “practiced by physicians within that 
specialty.”). See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3).
27. See id. § 9:2794(D)(3).
28. See generally id.
29. See generally Pertuit, 170 So. 3d 1106.
30. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(1) (providing that to testify as an expert,
a witness must meet all of the following criteria: (A) he is practicing medicine at
the time he offers testimony or at the time the claim arose; (B) he has knowledge
of the applicable standards of care; (C) he is “qualified on the basis of training or
experience” to offer expert testimony regarding those standards of care; and (D) 
he is licensed to practice medicine in Louisiana or any other U.S. jurisdiction, or
is a graduate of an accredited medical school); see also Benjamin v. Zeichner, 113
So. 3d 197, 204 (La. 2013) (holding that § 9:2794(D)(1) requires that the witness
is a physician currently licensed to practice medicine or is a graduate of an
accredited medical school).
31. See generally Pertuit, 170 So. 3d at 1110; Primeaux v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 862 So. 2d 496, 503 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003).
32. See Primeaux, 862 So. 2d at 503 (“When the alleged negligence of a 
specialist is at issue, only those qualified in that specialty may offer expert
testimony and evidence of the applicable standard of care.”); Steib v.
Waguespack, 168 So. 3d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015). But see Pertuit, 
170 So. 3d at 1110.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  375 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
  
   
   
    
   
   
    
  
   
   
   
    
  
  




   
 
   
  
  
   
 
      
 
        
  
   
 
 
             
           
         
 
      
2021] COMMENT 1483
defendant’s same field of medicine.33 In addition, the revision guarantees
that a plaintiff, experiencing difficulty locating an expert witness actively
practicing in the defendant’s field of medical practice, will not be left
without a qualified expert witness.34 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the issues that gave rise to the
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act and the Act’s current requirements.
Part I will further discuss expert witness qualification under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:2794 and the statute’s legislative history. Lastly, Part
I will explain the judicial standards regarding expert witness qualification
and examine the basic structure of medical education. Part II will analyze
Louisiana cases in which expert witness testimony was either admitted or
excluded, based on differing judicial interpretations of § 9:2794, in light
of the practice area of the defendant healthcare provider. Part III will
examine how other states determine expert witness qualification in 
medical malpractice actions. In conclusion, Part IV will propose that the 
Louisiana Legislature should revise § 9:2794 to promote clarity and
consistency for Louisiana medical malpractice litigants. 
I. LOUISIANA’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
In 1975, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act.35 The Act provides the limits associated with bringing a
medical malpractice claim, such as a cap on damages, prescriptive periods,
and standards governing expert testimony.36 Nearly 30 years after
enactment, the legislature added § 9:2794(D) to the Medical Malpractice
Act.37 Section 9:2794(D) provides additional standards regarding expert
witness qualification in medical malpractice claims.38 
33. See Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 685 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir
2014).
34. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3). See also Rickee N. Arntz,
Competency of Medical Expert Witnesses: Standards and Qualifications, 42
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1359, 1379–80 (1990) (The “reluctance of physicians to
testify against fellow physicians” often makes it difficult for plaintiff’s attorneys
to obtain expert testimony).
35. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231 (2019); Nickel, supra note 7, at 313.
36. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1231, 9:5628, 9:2794.
37. 2003 La. Acts No. 581 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3)
(2003)).
38. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  376 5/26/21  11:50 AM






    
 
    
    
   
    
   
 
 
   
  
   
  
 
    
    
  
   
 
     
    
     
 
 
   
     
     
       
   
   
         
 
     
     
       
      
       
   
1484 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
A. The Push for Reform
As a response to the insurance crisis of the 1970s,39 the Louisiana 
Legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Act to “stabilize medical
malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability of affordable
medical services to the public.”40 Insurance premiums41 drastically rose
during the 1970s as medical malpractice insurers rapidly exited the market
due to significant financial losses.42 In Louisiana alone, four malpractice
insurers left the market, leaving only two providers.43 When these four
providers disappeared, premiums increased by at least 300%.44 The drastic 
increase in premiums left doctors unable to afford the necessary
malpractice insurance required to provide healthcare.45 In the wake of the 
insurance crisis, there was a dispute over whether the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act was necessary to help lower the rising premiums.46 
Proponents of medical malpractice reform argued that excessive jury
awards were responsible for premium increases, as juries were often
inclined to “irrationally overcompensate medical malpractice victims.”47 
Opponents of medical malpractice reform argued that the premium
increases were instead the result of normal, cyclical increases in costs.48 
Nonetheless, proponents of the Medical Malpractice Act prevailed.49 The 
governor signed the act into law on August 4, 1975.50 
39. Nickel, supra note 7, at 315.
40. Id. at 313.
41. Julie Kagan, Insurance Premium, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/i/insurance-premium.asp [https://perma.cc/6RT5-7RW9] (last
updated Aug. 19, 2020) (defining an insurance premium as “the amount of money
an individual or business pays for an insurance policy”).
42. See Allison B. Lewis, Unreasonable and Imperfect: Constitutionality of
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act’s Limit on Recovery, 69 LA. L. REV. 417,
418 (2009); see also Nickel, supra note 7, at 314.
43. Nickel, supra note 7, at 315.
44. Id.
45. See Lewis, supra note 42, at 418 (“In a 1975 national survey, doctors in
sixteen states reported ‘difficulty’ in obtaining coverage that they considered a
precondition to their individual practices.”); see also Nickel, supra note 7, at 315.
46. See generally Nickel, supra note 7, at 315.
47. See Lewis, supra note 42, at 418–19.
48. Nickel, supra note 7, at 315.
49. See Lewis, supra note 42, at 419.
50. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1485
B. The Framework of Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice Act
The Medical Malpractice Act sets forth the procedure for bringing a
claim against a qualified healthcare provider.51 As a prerequisite to filing 
suit, a plaintiff must submit a medical malpractice claim to a medical
review panel.52 The panel, made up of three healthcare providers and a
non-voting attorney, issues a decision on whether the defendant healthcare
provider breached the applicable standard of care, which a party may then
use as evidence.53 Even if the panel concludes that the defendant did not
breach the standard of care,54 a plaintiff can still file suit.55 If a plaintiff
prevails in his medical malpractice claim, the damages as a whole cannot
exceed $500,000.56 The damages against the defendant, in his or her
individual capacity, cannot exceed $100,000.57 Anything in excess of
$100,000 is covered by the Patient’s Compensation Fund.58 Further, a
claim for medical malpractice prescribes59 one year from the date of the
51. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1 (2019) (defining “health care provider”
as “a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company,
corporation, facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide
healthcare or professional services as a physician, hospital, nursing home,
community blood center, tissue bank, dentist”).
52. See id. § 40:1231.8 (providing that a medical review panel, made up of
three health care providers and a non-voting attorney, issues an “expert opinion
as to whether or not the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or
defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate standards of care”); see 
also Nickel, supra note 7, at 314.
53. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(H).
54. Since 2000, only 7% of medical review panels have found that a
physician breached the standard of care. See Rebecca Catalanello, Five Things to
Know about Medical Malpractice in Louisiana, NOLA.COM (Feb. 6, 2015),
https://www.nola.com/entertainment_life/health_fitness/article_df9a17a8-3974-
5b87-90db-ef030b27e5f9.html [https://perma.cc/E6MG-GUGV].
55. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8; Nickel, supra note 7, at 314.
56. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2.
57. Id.
58. See also Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund, LOUISIANA DIVISION
OF ADMINISTRATION, https://www.doa.la.gov/Pages/pcf/Index.aspx [https://perm
a.cc/HM8Y-E44H] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021) (“The Fund was created in 1975
to provide an affordable and guaranteed medical malpractice coverage system for
the private healthcare providers in the state.”). The Patient’s Compensation Fund
acts as an “excess insurer” for private healthcare providers. Id. Healthcare
providers enrolled in the Patient’s Compensation Fund pay surcharges for
protection from liability in excess of $100,000. Id.
59. A claim that has prescribed is invalid due to prescription. See Prescribe,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Prescription is the extinction of a
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  378 5/26/21  11:50 AM





    




      
 
 
    
  
  
   
 







     
 
  
    
         
      
 
    
     
      
        
  
        
   
        
 
       
   
   
   
1486 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
alleged medical malpractice or one year from the date of plaintiff’s
discovery of the malpractice.60 In any event, a medical malpractice claim
prescribes if not filed within three years from the date of the alleged
malpractice.61 At trial, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794 governs the
standards for expert witness qualification in a medical malpractice
action.62 
1. The Legislative History of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794
In 2003, the Louisiana Legislature introduced House Bill 520 (HB
520), now codified as § 9:2794(D), as an addition to Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2794.63 HB 520 states the standards that a witness must meet
to testify as an expert.64 The standards introduced in the bill are nearly
identical to those in the current version of § 9:2794(D), except for two 
major differences.65 First, HB 520 provided that, in deciding whether a
witness is qualified on the basis of training or experience, the “court shall
consider whether” the witness has “substantial training or experience in an
area relevant to the claim and is actively practicing medicine and rendering
medical care services relevant to the claim.”66 Next, HB 520 permitted a
court to depart from the aforementioned standard if a court determined
that, under the circumstances, there was “a good reason to admit the
testimony of the individual.”67 
Before passing HB 520, the House of Representatives amended the 
bill by deleting the provisions that allowed courts to depart from the
proposed language.68 After receiving HB 520, the Senate further amended
claim due to a failure to exercise that claim within a certain period of time. See 
Prescription, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
60. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:5628. A filing of a request for a medical review
panel suspends the running of prescription. Id. § 40:1231.8(A)(2)(a). However,
the suspension of prescription ceases 90 days after all parties are notified of the
panel’s decision. Id. § 40:1231.8(L).
61. See id. § 9:5628.
62. See id. § 9:2794. See generally Leonard J. Nelson, III et al., Medical
Malpractice Reform in Three Southern States, 4. J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69,
98 (2008).
63. 2003 La. Acts No. 581 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2003));
see H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003). 
64. 2003 La. Acts No. 581 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2003));
H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
65. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003). But see id. § 9:2794(D).
66. H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1487
the House’s version by changing “substantial training or experience in an
area relevant to the claim and is actively practicing medicine and rendering
medical care services relevant to the claim” to require that the court
consider whether the witness has “substantial training or experience in an
area of medical practice relevant to the claim and is actively practicing in 
that area.”69 The bill’s initial language directed courts to consider whether
the witness provided healthcare services “in an area relevant to the claim,”
without any focus on whether the witness was “actively practicing in that
area” of “medical practice relevant to the claim.”70 The Senate’s addition
of the words “medical practice” and “in that area” demonstrates that the
Senate viewed both the witness’s area of medicine and his active practice
in that area as important in determining whether he is qualified to testify
against a medical malpractice defendant, whose “area of medical practice” 
is that which is “relevant to the claim.”71 
The amendments to HB 520, and the bill’s final passage including
those amendments, demonstrate that the legislature did not intend for
courts to have unbridled discretion in establishing expert witness
qualification under the statute.72 Instead, the legislature intended for courts
to look to both the witness’s field of medicine and that of the defendant in
ruling on expert witness qualification.73 
69. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess., Summary of Senate Amendments (La. 2003)
(emphasis added).
70. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) (emphasis added).
71. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess., Summary of Senate Amendments (La. 2003);
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2018).
72. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess., Summary of Senate Amendments (La. 2003);
2003 La. Acts No. 581 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2003)).
73. See H.B. 520, Reg. Sess. When the bill was originally introduced,
subsection (D)(3) provided that the court shall consider whether “the witness is
board certified or has other substantial training or experience in an area of medical
practice relevant to the claim and is actively practicing medicine and rendering
medical care services relevant to the claim” to determine whether a witness is
qualified on the basis of training or experience. Id. After the bill’s final passage,
which included the adoption of the Senate’s amendments, subsection (D)(3)
provided that the court shall consider whether the witness “has other substantial 
training or experience in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim and is
actively practicing in that area” to determine if a witness qualifies as an expert on
the basis of training or experience. 2003 La. Acts No. 581 (codified at LA. REV.
STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2003)); H.B. 520, Reg. Sess., Summary of Senate
Amendments (La. 2003).
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1488 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794 Today 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2794 explains the plaintiff’s burden of
proof in a medical malpractice lawsuit and the guidelines that a witness
must meet to qualify as an expert.74 The plaintiff must establish: (1) the 
relevant standard of care, or the defendant’s duty; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) that the plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) that the injuries were a
“proximate result” of the defendant’s breach.75 The applicable standard of
care depends on whether the defendant is a general practitioner or a 
specialist.76 When the defendant is a general practitioner, the plaintiff must 
prove the standard of care exercised by providers practicing in “a similar
community or locale and under similar circumstances” to the defendant.77 
When the defendant is a specialist, the plaintiff must prove the standard of
care owed by healthcare providers in that “involved medical specialty.”78 
Thus, the plaintiff must prove a more specific standard of care for
specialists.79 
Section 9:2794(D)(1) provides the standards a witness must meet to
qualify as an expert regarding the applicable standard of care.80 A witness
must meet all of the following requirements: (1) the witness is practicing
medicine at the time he offers testimony or at the time the claim arose; (2)
the witness has knowledge of the “accepted standards of medical care” 
involved in the claim; (3) the witness is “qualified on the basis of training
or experience” to testify as to the those standards; and (4) the witness is
licensed to practice medicine or is a graduate of an accredited medical
school.81 Section 9:2794(D)(2) states that “practicing medicine” or
“medical practice” under the statute includes teaching students or residents
at an accredited medical school.82 
Section 9:2794(D)(3) directs courts to consider whether the witness is 
“actively practicing” in an area of medicine “relevant to the claim” in
74. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
75. See id. § 9:2794(A).
76. See id. § 9:2794(A)(1).
77. See id.
78. See id.; Steib v. Waguespack, 168 So. 3d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2014). For example, when the defendant is an emergency room physician, a
recognized medical specialty, the plaintiff must prove the standard of care owed
by an emergency room physician. See Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 3d 13, 17 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2017).
79. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(A)(1).
80. See id. § 9:2794(D)(1).
81. See id.
82. See id. § 9:2794(D)(2).
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2021] COMMENT 1489
ruling whether a witness is “qualified on the basis of training or
experience” under § 9:2794(D)(1).83 Finally, § 9:2794(D)(4) provides that
courts must apply the standards provided in (D)(1), (D)(2), and (D)(3) to
establish whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert.84 Although
§ 9:2794 assists courts’ rulings on expert witness qualifications,
specifically in medical malpractice cases, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Louisiana Supreme Court have established factors that provide courts with
general guidance when establishing whether a witness qualifies as an
expert in any type of case.85 
C. Daubert and the Gatekeeper, Foret, and § 9:2794
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. marked the advent of judicial standards, from the
nation’s highest court, that assist state and federal courts evaluating expert
witness testimony.86 The plaintiffs in Daubert, two minor children and
their parents, sued for damages alleging that Bendectin, an anti-nausea
medication marketed by the defendant, caused the children to be born with
birth defects.87 The district court ruled that the plaintiff’s evidence that
Bendectin caused birth defects was inadmissible because it “had not been
published or subjected to peer review,” and the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s suit on a motion for summary judgment.88 After the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision,89 the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari “in light of sharp divisions among the
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert witness
83. See id. § 9:2794(D)(1), (D)(3).
84. See id. § 9:2794(D)(1)–(4).
85. See generally id. § 9:2794; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123–24 (La. 1993);
Cheairs v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 861 So. 2d 536, 542 (La. 2003).
86. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
87. Id. at 582; see also Katherine M. Atikian, Nasty Medicine: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Applied to a Hypothetical Medical
Malpractice Case, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1513, 1515–16 (1994).
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584.
89. The Ninth Circuit cited Frye v. United States in holding that the studies
introduced by the plaintiffs were not “generally accepted” by the relevant
scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“While courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
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1490 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
testimony.”90 In providing standards for state and federal courts to use to
determine whether to admit expert testimony,91 the Daubert Court held 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 70292 requires the trial judge to assume a
“gatekeeping role” to ensure that all scientific testimony or evidence is
relevant and reliable.93 Although not exclusive and not necessarily
applicable to every case,94 Daubert introduced four “general observations”
to assist the trial judge in ruling whether the expert witness testimony is
relevant and reliable scientific knowledge under Rule 702.95 The “general
observations” are: (1) whether a theory or technique has been tested; (2) 
whether a theory or technique has been peer reviewed and published; (3)
the known or potential rate of error; and (4) general acceptance.96 
In State v. Foret, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Daubert’s
“general observations” based on the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 are identical.97 The court also
viewed the Daubert standards as helpful, though not required, in 
establishing reliability.98 Following its decision in State v. Foret, the
Louisiana Supreme Court again examined Daubert’s applicability to
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 in Cheairs v. State ex rel. 
Department of Transportation & Development.99 The defendant in the
90. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
91. Id.
92. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: the expert’s scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue; the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
93. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
94. The Supreme Court in articulating the Daubert factors did not mandate
their application to every case involving scientific, expert testimony. See Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (“The conclusion, in our
view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for
subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence.”). The
Daubert factors do not apply “for all cases and for all the time.” Id.
95. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94.
96. Id. at 593–94; see also Atikian, supra note 87, at 1521.
97. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123–24 (La. 1993); see FED R. EVID.
702; LA. CODE. EVID. art. 702 (2019).
98. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123.
99. Cheairs v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 861 So. 2d 536, 538 (La.
2003).
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2021] COMMENT 1491
case, the Department of Transportation and Development, argued that the
court of appeal misapplied Daubert and erred in affirming the district
court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s traffic accident reconstructionist was
qualified to testify as an expert.100 In affirming the court of appeal’s ruling,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Daubert factors do not directly
address whether an expert has the proper qualifications to testify.101 
Rather, the factors address whether an expert’s methodology is reliable.102 
Although Cheairs did not reject Daubert and Foret, the court adopted
three principles providing “more comprehensive guidance” to district
courts ruling on whether to admit expert witness testimony.103 
Louisiana courts determine expert witness qualifications pursuant to
§ 9:2794 in relation to the statute’s provisions and the Daubert and
Cheairs factors.104 The Cheairs court’s three principles for the admission
of expert testimony are:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the
matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the
expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as
determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3)
the testimony assists the trier of fact through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue.105 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has not adopted a rule requiring
a Daubert hearing each time a litigant challenges an expert’s
qualifications.106 Where a judge does decide to employ an analysis under
Daubert and Cheairs, § 9:2794 serves as guidance for the judge in
establishing whether the witness meets the first prong of Cheairs: whether
“the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he
intends to address.”107 Further, § 9:2794 directs a judge to examine
whether a medical witness possesses the “specialized experience” needed 
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id. at 538.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 542–43.
104. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579; State v. Foret, 
628 So. 2d 1116, 1123–24 (La. 1993); Cheairs, 861 So. 2d at 538; Thomas v.
Drew, 240 So. 3d 980, 983 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018).
105. See Cheairs, 861 So. 2d at 542.
106. See Pertuit v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 170 So. 3d 1106,
1111–12 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015). See generally Cheairs, 861 So. 2d at 536.
107. See Cheairs, 861 So. 2d at 542.
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1492 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
to help the plaintiff meet the burden of proof.108 Given the great number
of medical disciplines that exist, including specialty and sub-specialty
fields, litigants have difficulty establishing expert witness qualification.109 
As the statute requires a witness to “actively practice” in an “area of
medical practice relevant to the claim,” the witness’s medical education is
crucial in the determination of expert witness qualification.110 
D. Disagreement in Expert Witness Qualification 
An expert witness in a medical malpractice case offers an opinion as
to the relevant standard of care and the defendant healthcare provider’s
breach of that standard of care; thus, it is vital that the witness be
adequately trained in the defendant’s same field of medicine.111 Due to the
variance in the duration of post-medical school education and training
between different fields of medical practice, a proposed expert witness and
a defendant may be of different levels of medical education.112 Because a 
plaintiff’s proposed expert witness will give his opinion as to the
applicable standard of care and whether there was a breach in that standard
of care,113 a detailed examination of a witness’s credentials is necessary to 
ensure that the witness is qualified to offer that opinion.114 Since medical
education can vary according to specialty, it is crucial that § 9:2794(D)(3)
contains a clear requirement that to be an expert, one must actively
108. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–48 (1999); see 
also LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
109. See Anesthesiology to Urology: Your Ultimate List of Medical Specialties
and Subspecialties, ST. GEORGE UNIVERSITY (Dec. 12, 2011), https://
www.sgu.edu/blog/medical/ultimate-list-of-medical-specialties/ [https://perma.c
c/GPL8-NC9D]; Specialty and Subspecialty Certificates, AMERICAN BOARD OF
MEDICAL SPECIALTIES, https://www.abms.org/member-boards/specialty-sub
specialty-certificates/ [https://perma.cc/M8MG-C499]. See generally Lee v. 
Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017); Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic
Found., 245 So. 3d 58 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2018).
110. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D). See generally Anesthesiology to
Urology, supra note 109; Specialty and Subspecialty Certificates, supra note 109. 
111. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794; Anesthesiology to Urology, supra
note 109; Specialty and Subspecialty Certificates, supra note 109. 
112. See generally ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE 
ROAD TO BECOMING A DOCTOR (2020), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/2019-
12/Road_to_Becoming_a_Doctor_December%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY
5Q-K4LE].
113. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794; Schultz v. Guoth, 57 So. 3d 1002 (La. 2011);
Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994).
114. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, supra note 112.
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2021] COMMENT 1493
practice, and thus be highly educated in, the defendant’s same field of
medicine.115 
In interpreting § 9:2794, some courts already adopt the “actively
practicing” approach and hold that the statute requires a witness to actively
practice in the same field of medicine as the defendant to be deemed an 
expert.116 The First Circuit Court of Appeal, in Penn v. CarePoint Partners
of Louisiana, L.L.C., excluded testimony from a cardiologist who opined
that the defendant-hospitalist breached the standard of care.117 In Franklin
v. Tulane University Hospital & Clinic, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
excluded testimony from a cardiothoracic surgeon118 and critical care 
specialist.119 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had to introduce
testimony from an expert in either of the defendants’ same fields of
medicine, pediatric nephrology120 or pediatric critical care, to satisfy her
burden of proof under § 9:2794.121 
Conversely, some courts permit a witness to testify as an expert based
on the witness’s knowledge of the subject matter or based on an overlap
between the witness’s field of medicine and the defendant’s field of
medicine.122 For example, in Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation the 
115. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3).
116. See Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017); Penn v.
CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31–32 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2015).
117. See Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31–32; What is a Hospitalist?, AMERICAN BOARD
OF PHYSICIAN SPECIALTIES, https://www.abpsus.org/hospitalist [https://perma
.cc/3RW9-8RL7] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (defining a hospitalist as “a
physician who must master the specific skill set and knowledge required to treat 
and care for patients in the hospital”).
118. A cardiothoracic surgeon specializes in surgery of the heart, lungs, and
other organs in the chest. What Is a Cardiothoracic Surgeon, THE SOCIETY OF
THORACIC SURGEONS?, https://ctsurgerypatients.org/what-is-a-cardiothoracic-
surgeon [https://perma.cc/PG94-7G22] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
119. See Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369, 376 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007). A critical care specialist cares for seriously injured or ill
patients, and patients who have undergone major surgery. Critical Care, MAYO 
CLINIC (July 12, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-centers/critical-
care/sections/overview/ovc-20399554 [https://perma.cc/JYG7-4HAB].
120. Nephrology involves the diagnosis and treatment of kidney diseases. 
Nephrology, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, https://www.acponline.org
/about-acp/about-internal-medicine/subspecialties/nephrology [https://perma.cc/
46QC-VTWP] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
121. See Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
122. See Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La. Ct. App. 
4th Cir. 2018); Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
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1494 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, marking a departure from its prior
decision in Franklin v. Tulane University Hospital & Clinic,123 admitted
expert testimony from a general surgeon, even though he had never
practiced in the defendants’ fields of medicine—orthopedic surgery and
hospital medicine.124 The Fourth Circuit in Pennington held that the 
witness qualified as an expert based on his knowledge of the subject
matter.125 Also, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Kieffer v. Plunkett-
Kuspa ruled that a neurologist was a qualified expert in internal medicine
based on the neurologist’s testimony that there was an overlap between the
two fields of medicine.126 The varying and unpredictable judicial
interpretations of § 9:2794 force plaintiffs and defendants to spend
additional time and money—on already costly claims—to litigate disputes
over expert witness qualification.127 
II. ADMIT OR EXCLUDE: WHO QUALIFIES AS AN EXPERT UNDER §
9:2794?
To the detriment of the litigant, Louisiana courts publish conflicting
decisions as to whether § 9:2794(D)(3) requires a witness to practice in
the same area of medicine as the defendant to qualify as an expert under
§ 9:2794(D)(1).128 In particular, the Fourth Circuit’s inconsistency among
its own opinions exacerbates the inability of litigants to receive clear
direction in the admission of expert witnesses.129 The First and Fourth
see also Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir
2014).
123. See Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376.
124. See Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64.
125. See id.
126. See Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85.
127. See id.; Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64. But see Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376.
See generally Peeples & Harris, supra note 10, at 710–12.
128. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(1) (2018); id. § 9:2794(D)(3); Pertuit v.
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 170 So. 3d 1106, 1110 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2015) (“R.S. 9:2794 has no absolute requirement that a proffered expert must
practice in the same specialty as the defendant or be board certified in that 
specialty.”). But see Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015); Steib v. Waguespack, 168 So. 3d 410, 414 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st Cir. 2014) (“Where the defendant practices in a practices in a particular
specialty and the alleged acts of medical negligence raise issues peculiar to the
particular medical specialty involved,” the plaintiff must prove the standard of
care of “practiced by physicians within that specialty.”).
129. See Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2007). But see Pennington, 245 So. 3d 58.
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Circuits interpret § 9:2794 as requiring that the witness practice in the 
same field of medicine as the defendant.130 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit
also finds, along with the Second and Fifth Circuits, that merely a 
witness’s knowledge of the defendant’s field of medicine can render him
qualified as an expert “on the basis of training or experience.”131 These
circuits, however, view the witness’s area of practice only as a factor that
the court has discretion to consider.132 
A. Exclusion of Testimony Where the Witness Practiced in a Different
Field Than the Defendant
The First and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal apply the literal
language of § 9:2794(D) and exclude testimony from a potential expert
witness practicing in a different field of medicine than the defendant,
because that witness does not qualify as an expert “on the basis of training
or experience.”133 These courts, specifically in Penn v. CarePoint Partners
of Louisiana, L.L.C, Lee v. Quinn, and Franklin v. Tulane University
Hospital & Clinic, require the witness’s field of medicine to match the
defendant’s for the witness to qualify as an expert.134 
1. Penn v. CarePoint Partners of Louisiana, L.L.C.: A Plain Reading 
of § 9:2794
In Penn v. CarePoint Partners of Louisiana, L.L.C., plaintiff Danny
Penn filed a medical malpractice action against Our Lady of the Lake
Regional Medical Center (OLOL) after being diagnosed with Dandy’s
Syndrome.135 Doctors at OLOL administered Gentamicin, an antibiotic
used to treat and prevent bacterial infection, which caused Penn’s Dandy’s
130. Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017); Penn, 181
So. 3d at 31–32.
131. See Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64.
132. See Harper, 86 So. 3d at 696; Pertuit, 170 So. 3d at 1110.
133. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D); see Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31–32; Lee, 229 So.
2d at 18; see also Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376.
134. See Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31–32; Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18; Franklin, 972 So.
2d at 376.
135. Penn, 181 So. 3d at 28; see also Daniel J. DeNoon, Dizziness Not Always
Child’s Play, WEBMD (Sept. 17, 2001), https://www.webmd.com/healthy-
aging/features/dizziness-not-always-childs-play#1 [https://perma.cc/9ZP7-W9SF]
(Dandy’s Syndrome is characterized as dizziness and loss of balance resulting from
the administering of an antibiotic that is toxic for the ears).
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1496 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Syndrome.136 Penn claimed that Dr. Giarusso, a hospitalist137 who treated 
Penn at OLOL, breached the standard of care by administering an incorrect
dosage of Gentamicin.138 OLOL filed a motion for summary judgment139 
seeking to dismiss Penn’s suit.140 Penn filed an opposition to OLOL’s
motion for summary judgment and in support attached the affidavit of Dr.
Shih, a board-certified cardiologist.141 Dr. Shih stated in the affidavit that
Dr. Giarusso breached the standard of care when he administered an
incorrect dosage of Gentamicin.142 At the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, the district court found that Dr. Shih was “not
qualified,” granted OLOL’s motion, and dismissed Penn’s claim.143 
On appeal, the First Circuit found that Dr. Shih’s affidavit was
inadmissible, affirming the district court’s ruling that Dr. Shih, as an
expert in cardiology, was not qualified “on the basis of training or
experience” to offer an expert opinion regarding the standard of care
applicable to a hospitalist.144 The First Circuit noted that Dr. Shih’s
affidavit offered only his expert opinion in cardiology, and, therefore, it
would not assist the trier of fact in determining whether Dr. Giarusso 
breached the standard of care that a hospitalist owes to patients.145 The 
Penn court’s ruling indicates that a witness does not qualify as an expert
on the standard of care applicable to the defendant when that witness does
not actively practice in the defendant’s field of medicine.146 
136. Penn, 181 So. 3d at 27–29.
137. See What is a Hospitalist?, supra note 117 (defining a hospitalist as “a
physician who must master the specific skill set and knowledge required to treat 
and care for patients in the hospital”).
138. Penn, 181 So. 3d at 28.
139. See Motion for Summary Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (defining a motion for summary judgment as “a request that the court enter
judgment without a trial because there is no genuine issue of material fact to be
decided by a fact-finder—that is, because the evidence is legally insufficient to
support a verdict in the nonmovant’s favor”).
140. Penn, 181 So. 3d at 28.
141. Id. at 28–29.
142. Id. at 32.
143. Id. at 29–30.
144. Id. at 32 (“The specialist . . . is held under the statute to the degree of care
ordinarily practiced by physicians within his medical specialty.”); see LA. REV.
STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2018).
145. Penn, 181 So. 3d at 32.
146. Id. at 31–32.
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2021] COMMENT 1497
2. Lee v. Quinn: The First Circuit’s Uniform Interpretation of
§ 9:2794 Following Its Decision in Penn v. CarePoint Partners of
Louisiana, L.L.C.
In Lee v. Quinn, the First Circuit relied on its opinion in Penn when 
again tasked with establishing expert witness qualification. 147 In Lee v. 
Quinn, plaintiff Anjel Lee filed a medical malpractice action on behalf of
her infant son against OLOL and Dr. Boudreaux, an emergency room
physician at OLOL.148 Lee brought her 13-month-old son, Landon Lee, to 
OLOL after he began experiencing respiratory distress and vomiting.149 
Medical staff transported Landon Lee by helicopter to the ECMO unit at
Ochsner Medical Center where he later died due to an enlarged heart.150 In
her petition, Anjel Lee alleged that Dr. Boudreaux provided improper care
and treatment to Landon by failing to timely and properly perform a
clinical exam, diagnose him, order appropriate tests and treatments, and
prescribe the proper medications.151 OLOL and Dr. Boudreaux filed a
motion for summary judgment to dismiss Lee’s claim.152 In opposition, 
Lee introduced an affidavit from Dr. Meliones, a board-certified pediatric
cardiologist specializing in pediatric critical care.153 At the summary
judgment hearing, the district court granted the defendants’ motion and
held that Dr. Meliones did not qualify as an expert in emergency room
medicine.154 
On appeal, the First Circuit, in affirming the district court’s ruling,
held that Dr. Meliones’s affidavit offered only his expert opinion in
cardiology and failed to show that he was qualified “on the basis of
training or experience” to offer an expert opinion as to the standard of care
owed by an emergency room physician.155 As a board-certified pediatric 
cardiologist, Dr. Meliones specialized in pediatric critical care and ECMO
ventilation.156 He knew how to treat children with heart problems, like
147. See Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017); see also
Penn, 181 So. 3d at 31–32.
148. Lee, 229 So. 2d at 14.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Petition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
petition as “the first pleading in a lawsuit”); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 14.
152. Lee, 229 So. 2d at 15.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 16.
155. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D) (2018); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18.
156. See LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18.
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1498 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Landon Lee.157 Regardless, the court excluded Dr. Meliones’s affidavit
and reasoned that a witness’s knowledge of the subject matter or level of
specialization is not relevant when determining whether a witness is
qualified as an expert “on the basis of training or experience” under
§ 9:2794.158 A plain-reading interpretation of § 9:2794(D), as conducted
first by the Penn court and again by the court in Lee, supports a finding
that a witness cannot offer an expert opinion concerning the standard of
care owed by a defendant when the witness does not practice in the 
defendant’s field of medicine.159 
3. Franklin v. Tulane University Hospital & Clinic: Exclusion of
Testimony Where the Witness’s Medical Field Did Not Match the 
Defendant’s
In addition to the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit also applies a literal
approach to § 9:2794(D).160 In Franklin v. Tulane University Hospital &
Clinic, plaintiff Brenda Franklin filed a medical malpractice suit against
Dr. Boineau and Dr. Akingbola on behalf of her seven-year-old daughter,
Shaylon Day.161 Day arrived at Tulane Hospital experiencing dehydration,
low blood pressure, and shock.162 She was transferred to the Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit and placed under the care of Dr. Boineau, a pediatric
nephrologist, and Dr. Akingbola, a pediatric critical care specialist.163 The 
doctors diagnosed Day with a possible ruptured appendix and kidney 
failure.164 Day’s condition soon worsened.165 She suffered cardiac arrest
and the doctors resuscitated her, but later she experienced multiple
seizures that left her in a persistent vegetative state.166 Franklin filed a
157. See Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18.
158. LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D); see Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18.
159. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D); see Lee, 229 So. 2d at 17–18.
160. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794; Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic,
972 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 13.
161. Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 370.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also id. at 370 n.3 (defining a nephrologist as “a specialist in the
treatment of kidney insufficiency and kidney disease”).
164. Id. at 370–71.
165. See id. at 371.
166. Id.; see also Stephen Ashwal M.D. et al., Medical Aspects of the
Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW J. MED. 1499 (1994), available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199405263302107 
[https://perma.cc/AN4N-S AD3] (defining persistent vegetative state as “a
vegetative state present one month after acute trauma or nontraumatic brain injury
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2021] COMMENT 1499
medical malpractice claim, alleging that Dr. Boineau and Dr. Akingbola
failed to promptly and properly diagnose and treat Day.167 In discovery, 
Franklin identified Dr. Palder, a pediatric general surgeon, and Dr. Viator,
a pediatrician and emergency room physician, as potential expert
witnesses.168 At their depositions, Dr. Palder and Dr. Viator separately
testified that both Dr. Boineau and Dr. Akingbola did not breach the 
standard of care.169 
Based on the testimony of Franklin’s witnesses, the defendants filed a 
motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss her claim.170 In her
opposition, Franklin submitted an affidavit from Dr. Adams, a
cardiothoracic surgeon and critical care specialist, who opined that the
defendants failed to properly treat and diagnose Day.171 The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed 
Franklin’s claim on the grounds that Dr. Adams was not qualified to render
an expert opinion on pediatric nephrology or pediatric critical care.172 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling and found that
to defeat the motion for summary judgment, Franklin had to submit an
affidavit or deposition testimony from a doctor specializing in pediatric
nephrology and pediatric critical care, the fields of medicine the
defendants practiced.173 The Fourth Circuit excluded Dr. Adams’s 
testimony under § 9:2794 because Dr. Adams did not practice, nor had he
ever practiced, pediatric nephrology or pediatric critical care.174 The
Franklin, Penn, and Lee courts’ holdings demonstrate that § 9:2794’s
plain language necessitates the exclusion of testimony from a purported 
or lasting for at least one month in patients with degenerative or metabolic
disorders or developmental malformations”).
167. Petition for Damages for Permanent and Irreversible Brain Damage at 13,
Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2007) (No. 20052307). 
168. Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 372; see also Discovery, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining discovery as “compulsory disclosure, at a 
party’s request, of information that relates to litigation”).
169. Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 372–73.
170. Id. at 373; see Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 139 (defining
a motion for summary judgment as “a request that the court enter judgment
without a trial because there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided by
a fact-finder—that is, because the evidence is legally insufficient to support a
verdict in the nonmovant’s favor”).
171. Franklin, 972 So.2d at 373.
172. Id. at 373–74 n.8.
173. Id. at 376.
174. Id.
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1500 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
expert who practices in a different area of medicine than the defendant
healthcare provider.175 
B. Admission of Testimony Where the Witness Practiced in a Different
Field Than the Defendant
The Fourth, Second, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal depart from
the literal language of § 9:2794 in ruling on expert witness testimony.176 
All three circuits find witnesses to be experts “qualified on the basis of
training or experience” in instances where the witnesses are not “actively
practicing” in the “area of medical practice relevant to the claim.”177 The 
Fourth Circuit’s decisions, specifically, indicate the inconsistency and
ambiguity surrounding expert witness qualification under § 9:2794.178 As
noted above, the Fourth Circuit, in Franklin v. Tulane University Hospital
& Clinic, followed the plain language of the statute and excluded the
witness’s testimony because the witness practiced in a different field of
medicine than the defendants.179 Eleven years later, however, the Fourth
Circuit reached an opposite conclusion in Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic
Foundation.180 The Second Circuit in Harper v. Minor and the Fifth
Circuit in Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa also allowed expert testimony from
witnesses in different fields of medical practice than the defendants.181 
1. Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation: The Fourth Circuit’s 
Shift From Its Franklin Decision 
Unlike its ruling in Franklin,182 the Fourth Circuit in Pennington v.
Ochsner Clinic Foundation disregarded § 9:794 entirely and held that a
175. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018); see also Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376;
Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31–32 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
Cir. 2015); Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
176. See Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2018); Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir 2014).
177. See Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64; Harper, 86 So. 3d at 696; Kieffer, 138 
So. 3d at 684–85.
178. See Franklin, 972 So. 2d 369. But see Pennington, 245 So. 3d 58.
179. The Fourth Circuit held that without offering testimony from a witness
practicing pediatric nephrology or pediatric critical care—the defendants’ fields
of medicine—the plaintiffs could not satisfy their burden of proof under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:2794. Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 376.
180. Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 58.
181. See Harper, 86 So. 3d at 690; Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 682.
182. See Franklin, 972 So. 2d at 369.
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2021] COMMENT 1501
witness’s “knowledge of the requisite subject matter” controls whether a
court will deem him a qualified expert.183 In Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic 
Foundation, plaintiff Dorothy Pennington filed a medical malpractice 
lawsuit against Dr. Todd, Dr. Hawawini, Dr. Jones, and Dr. Ulfers on
behalf of her brother Richard Smallwood.184 Smallwood underwent knee
surgery at Ochsner-Baptist Hospital and died after suffering a pulmonary
embolism.185 In her petition, Pennington alleged that Doctors Jones and
Ulfers, both hospitalists, failed to order that Smallwood take appropriate
anticoagulant medication186 post-surgery.187 The petition further alleged
that Dr. Todd, an orthopedic surgeon,188 failed to prescribe the requisite 
medication.189 Pennington offered expert witness testimony from Dr. 
Frangipane, a board-certified general surgeon.190 Dr. Frangipane testified 
to the standard of care applicable to hospitalists and orthopedic surgeons
and argued that the defendants breached the standard of care relevant to
each.191 The trial court admitted Dr. Frangipane’s testimony but found that
the testimony did not establish the applicable standards of care and ruled
in favor of the defendants.192 Pennington subsequently appealed the 
ruling.193 
On appeal, Pennington argued that Dr. Frangipane established the
standards of care applicable to all of the defendants.194 In answering the
appeal, the defendants argued that Dr. Frangipane, as a general surgeon,
183. See Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64.
184. Id. at 60.
185. Id. A pulmonary embolism is a blockage in the arteries of the lungs
caused by blood clots. Pulmonary Embolism, MAYO CLINIC, https://www
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/pulmonary-embolism/symptoms-causes/syc
-20354647 [https://perma.cc/96SS-24NY] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
186. Anticoagulants reduce the risk of blood clots, which can lead to a heart
attack or stroke. Anticoagulant and Antiplatelet Drugs, HEALTHLINE, https://
www.healthline.com/health/anticoagulant-and-antiplatelet-drugs [https://perma.cc
/JC5L-NVQ7] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
187. Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 60–64.
188. Orthopedic surgeons specialize in the “diagnosis and treatment of
disorders of the bones, joints, ligaments, tendons, muscles and nerves.”
Orthopedic Surgery, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-
centers/orthopedic-surgery/sections/overview/ovc-20126754 [https://perma.cc/B
4QL-FQQA] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
189. Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 60.
190. Id. at 64.
191. Id. at 63–64.
192. Id. at 61.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 63–64.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  394 5/26/21  11:50 AM






   
 
  
    
      
   












   
   
 
   
 
     








    
     
     
    
   
   
    
   
1502 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
was not qualified to testify as an expert on the applicable standards of care
because he had never practiced in orthopedic surgery and hospital
medicine, the specialties of the defendants.195 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal departed from the plain language of § 9:2794 and held that Dr.
Frangipane was qualified to testify as an expert even though he practiced
neither orthopedic surgery nor hospital medicine.196 In a divergence from
its Franklin holding that the witness’s field must match that of the
defendants, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Louisiana case law allows
witnesses to testify regarding medical fields in which they do not practice,
as long as the witness has “sufficient knowledge of the requisite subject
matter.”197 
2. Harper v. Minor: The Second Circuit’s Admittance of Testimony 
Based on the Witness’s Knowledge of the Defendant’s Field of
Medicine
In Harper v. Minor, the Second Circuit also employed a broad
interpretation of § 9:2794(D)(3) and admitted expert testimony based on
the witness’s knowledge of the subject matter, not his area of practice.198 
Plaintiff Deborah Harper filed suit against Dr. Minor and Dr. Davis
following a surgery to remove a benign breast tumor.199 Dr. Minor, a 
general surgeon, and Dr. Davis, a radiologist, performed the procedure
together.200 Dr. Minor reviewed an X-ray after the surgery and concluded
that the procedure was successful.201 Months later, Harper obtained a
mammogram which indicated that the defendants performed the procedure
incorrectly by removing breast tissue, not the tumor.202 Harper introduced
195. Id. at 64.
196. Id. But see LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(A) (2018) (“[W]here the defendant
practices in a particular medical specialty and where the alleged acts of medical
negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty involved, then
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily
practiced . . . within the involved medical specialty.”). See also id. § 9:2794(D)(3)
(“In determining whether a witness is qualified on the basis of training or
experience, the court shall consider whether . . . the witness is board certified or
has other substantial training or experience in an area of medical practice relevant 
to the claim and is actively practicing in that area.”) (emphasis added).
197. Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64.
198. See Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012).
199. Id. at 692.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (A subsequent mammogram revealed that “the earlier target lesion
remained intact in her breast”).
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2021] COMMENT 1503
Dr. Roderick Boyd as an expert in general surgery and in interpretation of
radiographic images.203 The trial court accepted Dr. Boyd as an expert in 
general surgery but found that he was not qualified to offer expert
testimony regarding the standard of care that applied to a radiologist.204 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Dr. Boyd could testify as to
the standard of care applicable to a radiologist.205 The Second Circuit
relied on § 9:2794(D)(3) and found that Dr. Boyd qualified as an expert in
radiology on the basis of “substantial training or experience.”206 The
Second Circuit ultimately held that a witness’s knowledge of the subject
matter, not his field of practice, determines whether he is qualified to
testify as an expert.207 The court viewed the “substantial training or
experience” language of the statute as the most important criteria that a
witness must meet, but failed to consider whether Dr. Boyd was “actively
practicing” in radiology, the field of medicine “relevant to the claim.”208 
3. Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa: A Glaring Dissent to the Majority’s 
Departure From § 9:2794
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Kieffer v. Plunkett-
Kuspa similarly illustrates a court’s departure from the “actively
practicing” requirement of § 9:2794.209 Plaintiff Jeana Kieffer brought a
medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Plunkett, an internist at Ochsner
Clinic.210 Kieffer arrived at Ochsner Clinic complaining of a headache,
fever, nausea, and vomiting.211 Dr. Plunkett treated Kieffer, diagnosed her
with a sinus infection, and prescribed medication.212 A few days later, 
203. Id. at 694.
204. Id. at 694–95 (The trial judge stated that Dr. Boyd was “qualified to make
a comment as to whether the general surgeon breached that standard of care
only”).
205. Id. at 696.
206. Id. (“La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(3) provides: In determining whether a witness
is qualified on the basis of training or experience, the court shall consider whether,
at the time the claim arose or at the time the testimony is given, the witness is
board certified or has other substantial training or experience in an area of
medical practice relevant to the claim and is actively practicing in that area.”).
207. See id.
208. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018).
209. See generally Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2014).
210. Id. at 683.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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1504 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Kieffer awoke without memory of herself or her husband.213 Kieffer’s
husband brought her to Ochsner Hospital, where she was diagnosed with
viral meningitis214 and encephalopathy.215 Kieffer alleged in her petition 
that Dr. Plunkett failed to properly diagnose and treat her, and she offered
testimony from Dr. Trahant, a board certified neurologist, in support.216 
Dr. Trahant opined that Dr. Plunkett breached the standard of care by 
failing to admit Kieffer to a hospital for evaluation.217 
During his deposition, Dr. Trahant stated that, as a neurologist, he
practiced medicine from the perspective of both an internist and a
neurologist when making diagnoses.218 He further stated that the standard
of care owed by Dr. Plunkett as an internist was no different than the
standard of care applicable to any other physician presented with a
situation like Kieffer’s.219 Based on Dr. Trahant’s testimony that there was
an overlap between his practice as a neurologist and Dr. Plunkett’s practice
as an internist, the Fifth Circuit held that Dr. Trahant was qualified as an
expert witness and admitted his testimony that Dr. Plunkett breached the
standard of care by not admitting Kieffer to a hospital.220 
Although the Fifth Circuit deviated from § 9:2794’s literal standards
in finding that a neurologist was qualified to testify as an expert against an
internist, not all members of the court, notably, were in agreement on the
majority’s holding.221 In his dissent, Judge Windhorst argued that the
standard of care owed by a neurologist, in diagnosing a rare condition such
as encephalitis, substantially differs from that of an internist.222 Dr.
Trahant had never practiced as an internist and was governed by the
213. Id.
214. Viral meningitis is the swelling of the protective membranes covering the
brain and spinal cord. Meningitis, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/meningitis/index.html [https://perma.cc/7U
KW-DF5Y] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
215. Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 683. Encephalopathy is a disease of the brain that
alters brain function or structure. Encephalopathy Information Page, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS AND STROKE, https://www.ninds
.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Encephalopathy-Information-Page [https://per
ma.cc/P8SZ-TV55] (last updated Mar. 27, 2019).
216. Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 685.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (“I don’t think the standard of care for primary care physicians are 
different than anybody else when faced with an illness of this type with the 
potential implications.”).
220. See id. at 684–85.
221. See id. at 685–86.
222. Id. at 686–87.
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2021] COMMENT 1505
standard of care applicable to a neurologist.223 Indeed, Judge Windhorst
maintained that Dr. Trahant was not qualified to offer expert testimony
that Dr. Plunkett breached the standard of care.224 
Judge Windhorst’s dissent demonstrates the present controversy
surrounding the interpretation of § 9:2794.225 In essence, trial judges
disagree over whether § 9:2794 requires a witness to practice in the
defendant’s area of medicine to be qualified as an expert.226 Under the
current language of § 9:2794, medical malpractice litigants will not have
predictability and consistency with respect to expert witness
qualification.227 To remedy this ambiguity, reduce litigation costs, and 
ensure consistency among court decisions, the Louisiana Legislature must
revise § 9:2794 to provide an explicit requirement that a witness must
practice in the defendant’s area of medicine.228 
Although Louisiana courts are split on whether § 9:2794 requires a
witness to practice in the defendant’s field of medicine, courts in other
states such as Alabama and Michigan remain consistent on this issue.229 
The statutes governing expert witness qualification in Alabama and
Michigan unambiguously provide that to be qualified as an expert, a
witness must practice in the defendant’s same field of medicine.230 
III: EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
LAWSUITS OUTSIDE LOUISIANA
Other states, such as Alabama and Michigan, have taken measures to
prevent unpredictability and inconsistency in medical expert witness 
qualification by enacting clear statutes for medical malpractice claims.231 
The courts in Alabama and Michigan follow statutory standards that
expressly require a witness to practice in the defendant’s same field of
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 686–88.
226. See id.
227. See generally LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794 (2018); See also Kieffer, 138 So.
3d at 686–88. But see Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017).
228. See generally id.
229. See Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 686–88. But see Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18. See 
generally Shadrick v. Grana, 279 So. 3d 553 (Ala. 2018); Sherrer v. Embry, 983
So. 2d 79, 82–83 (Ala. 2007). See also Woodard v. Custard, 719 N.W.2d 842, 860
(Mich. 2006).
230. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169
(West 2019).
231. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169
(West 2019).
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1506 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
medicine to be qualified as an expert.232 Unlike Louisiana courts, medical
malpractice litigants and trial judges in Alabama and Michigan, therefore,
have clarity and predictability with respect to expert witness
qualification.233 
A. Alabama’s Medical Liability Act
Alabama’s Medical Liability Act, which governs medical malpractice
actions, provides that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
defendant did not exercise “reasonable care, skill and diligence as other
similarly situated health care providers” ordinarily exercise.234 For a court
to admit a witness as an expert in the defendant’s field of medicine, the 
witness must be a “similarly situated health care provider” as defined by
the statute.235 When the defendant is not a specialist, the statute states that
a “similarly situated health care provider” is one who has practiced in the
same “discipline or school of practice” as the defendant within the year
prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.236 When the defendant is a 
specialist, the statute provides that a “similarly situated healthcare
provider” is one who practiced in the same specialty as the defendant in
the year prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.237 Further, where the
defendant is board-certified in a particular specialty, the witness must be
board-certified in that specialty.238 
232. See Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553; Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83; see also
Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860.
233. See Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553; Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83; see also
Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860.
234. ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
235. Id.
236. See id. (When the defendant is not a specialist, a “‘similarly situated
healthcare provider’ is one who meets all of the following qualifications: (1) Is
licensed by the appropriate regulatory board or agency of this or some other state.
(2) Is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice. (3) Has 
practiced in the same discipline or school of practice during the year preceding
the date that the alleged breach of the standard of care occurred”).
237. See id. (When the defendant is a specialist, a “‘similarly situated
healthcare provider’ is one who meets all of the following requirements: (1) Is
licensed by the appropriate regulatory board or agency of this or some other state.
(2) Is trained and experienced in the same specialty. (3) Is certified by an
appropriate American board in the same specialty. (4) Has practiced in this
specialty during the year preceding the date that the alleged breach of the standard
of care occurred”)
238. See id.
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2021] COMMENT 1507
In examining witness qualification under the Medical Liability Act,
the Alabama Supreme Court consistently holds that the Medical Liability
Act requires the witness’s field of medicine to precisely match the
defendant’s field of medicine.239 For example, in Shadrick v. Grana, the 
court excluded testimony from the plaintiff’s witness, a board-certified
cardiologist.240 The court found that the witness was not a “similarly
situated healthcare provider” under the Medical Liability Act, because the
defendant was a board-certified specialist in internal medicine, as opposed
to cardiology.241 Further, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a similar
holding under the Medical Liability Act in Sherrer v. Embry.242 The court
in Sherrer excluded testimony from the plaintiff’s witness, a physician
who practiced plastic and reconstructive surgery, because the defendant in
Sherrer was a general dentist.243 The court held that, in order for it to deem
the plaintiff’s witness a “similarly situated healthcare provider” according
to the Medical Liability Act, the witness had to have practiced dentistry in
the year prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.244 
The Alabama Medical Liability Act’s clear definition of “similarly
situated healthcare provider” produces consistent results for Alabama’s
medical malpractice litigants.245 The Act protects defendant healthcare 
providers facing potential liability for medical malpractice from damaging
testimony by witnesses who do not practice in the defendants’ same field
of medicine, yet hold themselves out as experts in the those fields.246 At
the same time, the Alabama Medical Liability Act provides plaintiffs with
clear standards in choosing a witness that will qualify as an expert
concerning the applicable standard of care and the defendant’s breach of
that standard of care.247 
Although the Alabama Supreme Court consistently rejects arguments
that a witness is qualified based on an overlap between his field of
medicine and that of the defendant’s, Louisiana courts accept the same
239. See generally Shadrick v. Grana, 279 So. 3d 553 (Ala. 2018); Sherrer v.
Embry, 983 So. 2d 79, 82–83 (Ala. 2007); Panayiotou v. Johnson, 995 So. 2d 871
(Ala. 2008).
240. Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553.
241. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
242. Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83; see ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
243. Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83.
244. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
245. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019); see also Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553;
Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83.
246. See generally Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir 2014).
247. See generally Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83.
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1508 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
arguments, in contravention of the plain language of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 9:2794.248 Louisiana courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Kieffer, 
look past the plain language of § 9:2794 in determining expert witness
qualification.249 In Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal allowed a neurologist to testify as an expert witness
against the defendant-internist.250 Based on the witness’s testimony that
there was an overlap between neurology and internal medicine, the Fifth
Circuit found that the witness qualified as an expert regarding the standard
of care applicable to the defendant-internist.251 Conversely, the Alabama 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Fisher rejected the argument that although the
witness practiced medicine in a different field than the defendant, an
overlap between the two fields rendered the witness qualified as an
expert.252 
In Alabama, the clear language of the Medical Liability Act leaves no
room for courts to depart from the Act’s straightforward, explicit
standards.253 Alabama courts only examine the witness’s practice area to
decide whether that witness may testify as an expert, and not other factors
such as overlap between different fields of medicine.254 A legislative
revision of § 9:2794 would ensure that all Louisiana courts look also to the
witness’s field of medicine in establishing whether that witness qualifies
as an expert.255 Like Alabama, Michigan’s medical malpractice law
contains the same requirement, that the witness’s field of medicine match
the defendant’s, and guarantees consistent results concerning expert
witness testimony.256 
B. Michigan: § 600.2169
Michigan’s statute governing expert witness testimony in medical
malpractice cases, Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 600.2169, is 
248. See Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85.
249. See id.; Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2018).
250. Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85.
251. Id.
252. See Smith v. Fisher, 143 So. 3d 110, 121–22 (Ala. 2013).
253. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019); see also Shadrick v. Grana, 279 So. 3d
553 (Ala. 2018); Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83.
254. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548; see also Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553; Sherrer, 
983 So. 2d at 82–83. But see Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 684–85.
255. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018).
256. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-548; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 
2019); see also Woodard v. Custard, 719 N.W.2d 842, 860 (Mich. 2006).
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2021] COMMENT 1509
similar to Alabama’s Medical Liability Act.257 Section 600.2169 provides
litigants with uniform standards that produce consistent judicial decisions
regarding expert witness qualification.258 Where the defendant is a
specialist, § 600.2169 provides that a witness must specialize in the same
field of medicine as the defendant.259 When the defendant is a board-
certified specialist, the witness must also be board certified in the same
specialty.260 During the year preceding the date of the alleged malpractice, 
a witness testifying against a specialist must have devoted a majority of
her time to either active practice in the defendant’s specialty or to teaching
the defendant’s specialty to medical students or residents.261 When the 
defendant is a general practitioner, the expert must have devoted a
majority of her time during the year prior to the date of malpractice to
either active practice as a general practitioner or to teaching the
defendant’s “same health profession” to medical students or residents.262 
The vital factor in considering whether a witness qualifies as an expert is
whether, in the year prior to the date of the alleged malpractice, that
witness has “devoted a majority of his or her professional time” to either
“active clinical practice” or the “instruction of students” in the defendant’s
same field of medicine.263 
The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the requirements of
§ 600.2169 in Woodard v. Custard, Michigan’s leading case on the
statute.264 In Woodard v. Custard, the Michigan Supreme Court examined
two lower court decisions, Woodard v. Custard and Hamilton v.
Kuligowski, to determine whether the plaintiffs’ witnesses in each case
qualified as experts under § 600.2169.265 In Woodard v. Custard, the
defendant was board certified in pediatrics with certificates of special
qualifications in pediatric care and neonatal-perinatal medicine.266 The
plaintiffs’ proposed expert witness was board certified in pediatrics but did
not possess any certificates of special qualifications.267 Certifications of
special qualifications in a specific area of medicine are equivalent to board
257. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169; see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-548.
258. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169; ALA. CODE § 6-5-548.




263. See Woodard v. Custard, 719 N.W.2d 828, 860 (Mich. 2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169.
264. See Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 842.
265. Id. at 847.
266. Id. at 847–48.
267. Id.
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1510 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
certification in that area of medicine for purposes of § 600.2169.268 The 
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that, because the infant-patient in Woodard
was critically ill when treated by the defendant, pediatric critical care was
the most relevant specialty.269 The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
excluding testimony from the plaintiffs’ witness.270 The court ruled that
the witness did not qualify as an expert under § 600.2169, because the
witness did not practice or teach pediatric critical care medicine in the year
preceding the alleged malpractice and was not board certified in pediatric
critical care medicine as required in the statute.271 
In Hamilton v. Kuligowski, the defendant-physician was board
certified in general internal medicine and specialized in general internal
medicine.272 Further, the defendant was practicing general internal
medicine at the time of the alleged malpractice; thus, it was the relevant
specialty.273 The plaintiff’s proposed expert witness was board certified in
general internal medicine but specialized in treating infectious diseases.274 
In his deposition, the witness acknowledged that he was “not sure what the
average internist sees day in and day out.”275 Based on the witness’s focus 
in infectious diseases, and not general internal medicine, the Michigan
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the witness did not
qualify as an expert according to § 600.2169.276 The court held that the
witness did not “devote a majority of his time,” in the year prior to the date
of alleged malpractice, to practicing or teaching general internal
medicine.277 
When the defendant is a general practitioner, § 600.2169 requires that
the witness must also be a general practitioner.278 Unlike the requirements 
that the witness’s specialty match the defendant’s when the latter is a
specialist, for general practitioners, Michigan courts require only that the
witness is a general practitioner, not that the witness engage in the same
type of general medical practice as the defendant.279 In Robins v. Garg, the
268. Id. at 853.
269. Id. at 858–59.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 859.
272. Id. at 848.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 860.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2019).
279. See id.; see also Robins v. Garg, 714 N.W.2d 49, 54–55 (Mich. Ct. App.
2007).
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2021] COMMENT 1511
defendant was a general practitioner, and the plaintiff offered a board-
certified family practitioner as a potential expert witness.280 The Michigan
Court of Appeals found that the witness qualified as an expert because the
witness was engaged in general practice as a family practitioner during the
year prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.281 Indeed, the Court of
Appeals noted that if the roles were reversed, and the defendant were a 
board-certified family practitioner, the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding
in Woodard v. Custer would require that the witness also be a board-
certified family practitioner.282 The court acknowledged that a board-
certified family practitioner is a specialist; therefore, a general practitioner
would not qualify as an expert witness.283 
Michigan’s § 600.2169 produces consistent, uniform decisions from
courts establishing expert witness qualification.284 Section 600.2169’s
clear language does not allow courts to depart from the standards it
requires an expert witness to meet.285 Michigan courts exclude witnesses
claiming knowledge of the defendant’s field of medicine when the witness
does not practice in that field.286 Although the Louisiana First and Fourth
Circuit Courts of Appeal take an approach similar to Michigan’s, other
Louisiana courts accept a witness as an expert under Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2794, despite the fact that the witness does not practice in the
defendant’s field of medicine, based solely on the witness’s claimed
knowledge of that field.287 While Alabama and Michigan require a
witness’s field of medical practice to match the defendant’s field precisely,
Colorado takes a broader approach to medical-expert witness qualification
in Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-64-401, similar to the approach taken
by the Louisiana Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal.288 
C. Colorado: § 13-64-401
Unlike Alabama and Michigan, Colorado’s § 13-64-401 does not
always require that a plaintiff’s witness practice in the defendant’s same
280. Robins, 714 N.W.2d at 51–52.
281. Id. at 54–55.
282. Id. at 54; see also Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 828.
283. Robins, 714 N.W.2d at 54.
284. See Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860; Robins, 714 N.W.2d at 54–55; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2019).
285. See Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860; Robins, 714 N.W.2d at 54–55; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169.
286. See Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169.
287. See Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 694–95 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012).
288. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019).
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1512 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
field of medicine, yet the statute explicitly provides for situations in which
a witness may still qualify as an expert even though he practices in a
different area of medicine than the defendant.289 Section 13-64-401 states
that an expert witness in a medical malpractice action must be
“substantially familiar with applicable standards of care and practice as
they relate to the act or omission which is the subject of the claim.”290 In
the event that the plaintiff’s witness practices in a different “medical
subspecialty” than the defendant, the statute provides that a witness must
demonstrate “substantial familiarity” in addition to showing that “the
standards of care and practice in the two fields are similar.”291 Colorado
courts hold, however, that the a witness from a field other than that of the
defendant will qualify as an expert if the witness has demonstrated either:
(1) “a substantial familiarity with the defendant’s specialty such that his
or her opinion is as well informed as any other expert in the defendant’s
specialty” or (2) “that the standard of care for both specialties is
substantially similar.”292 
In Hall v. Frankel, the defendant was an orthopedic surgeon, and the
plaintiffs offered expert testimony from “several orthopedic surgeons, two
hematologists,293 a pulmonologist,294 and three forensic pathologists.”295 
During trial, the defendant orthopedic surgeon made several objections to
the testimony from the expert witnesses who were not orthopedic




292. Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852, 858–59 (Colo. App. 2008).
293. Hematologists specialize in the treatment of diseases of blood and blood
components. Hematology, JOHN HOPKINS MEDICINE, https://www.hopkinsmed
icine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/hematology#:~:text=Hematology
%20is%20the%20study%20of,blood%20and%20bone%20marrow%20cells
[https://perma.cc/6TPR-Q757] (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
294. Pulmonologists specialize in the treatment of respiratory diseases. Know 
Your Providers: What Does a Pulmonologist Do?, AMERICAN LUNG 
ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/about-us/blog/2019/05/know-your-provide
rs-pulmonologist.html [https://perma.cc/GX3N-SLD2] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
295. Hall, 190 P.3d at 858. A forensic pathologist specializes in “the 
examination of persons who die suddenly, unexpectedly, or violently” to
determine the “cause and manner of death.” What Is a Forensic Pathologist?, 
NEW MEXICO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL INVESTIGATOR,
https://omi.unm.edu/about/faq/forensic-pathologist.html [https://perma.cc/ZU23-
KFKZ].
296. Hall, 190 P.3d at 858.
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2021] COMMENT 1513
allowing the testimony.297 In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the 
Colorado Court of Appeal held that a witness may testify against a
defendant in another field of medicine when the witness demonstrates a
“substantial familiarity with the defendant’s specialty” or demonstrates
that the standard of care between the two fields is “substantially
similar.”298 Further, the Court of Appeal found that the applicable standard
of care, which related to diagnosing and treating blood clots, was 
“common to all physicians and fourth-year medical students.”299 
Expert witness qualification under Colorado’s § 13-64-401 is not a
frequently litigated issue,300 because Colorado courts that decide whether
to admit expert witness testimony are uniform in their application of § 13-
64-401.301 A wholesale adoption of Colorado’s broad standards—that an
expert witness from a different field of medicine than the defendant must
have either a “substantial familiarity” with the defendant’s field or that the
witness demonstrate that the standards of care between the two fields are
similar—would generate further inconsistency and ambiguity for
Louisiana litigants.302 Section 9:2794(D)(3), as currently written, directs
courts to “consider whether . . . the witness” is “actively practicing” in “an
area of medical practice relevant to the claim”; and that language, although
seemingly explicit, generates unpredictable and inconsistent holdings
from Louisiana courts.303 Thus, a legislative revision that simply replaced
the current wording of § 9:2794(D)(3) with a general requirement that a
witness demonstrate a “substantial familiarity” with the defendant’s field
of medicine would not resolve the current inconsistency.304 Colorado’s
standard of “substantial familiarity,” however, could aid in establishing an
exception for Louisiana plaintiffs who cannot locate an expert willing to
testify against a fellow medical colleague.305 
297. Id.
298. Id. at 858–59.
299. Id. at 859.
300. A Westlaw search of “13-64-401” shows only 20 cases that have cited the 
statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019).
301. See Hall, 190 P. 3d at 859; see also Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383
(Colo. 1990).
302. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794
(2018).
303. LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794.
304. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401; LA. REV. STAT §
9:2794.
305. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401; Arntz, supra note 34,
at 1379–80.
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1514 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
A legislative revision of § 9:2794 is necessary to ensure that all
Louisiana courts establishing expert witness qualification will consider, as
courts in Alabama and Michigan do, the defendant’s field of medicine in
comparison to the witness’s as the deciding factor.306 Alabama’s Medical
Liability Act and Michigan’s § 600.2169 serve as guidance for a
legislative revision of § 9:2794 to ensure consistent application of the
statute and predictability for litigants.307 The Louisiana Legislature’s 
revision must provide that the witness’s field of medicine match the
defendant’s, but the revision must also include an exception to this
requirement to protect plaintiffs from being left without an expert and
shield defendants from testimony by an unqualified witness.308 The 
Louisiana Legislature should draw upon Colorado’s § 13-64-401’s when
drafting such an exception.309 
IV. REVISE § 9:2794—MATCHING THE FIELDS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
The Louisiana Legislature must revise § 9:2794 to ensure that all
courts abide by the same standards in deciding expert witness
qualification.310 Currently, § 9:2794(D)(3) provides:
In determining whether a witness is qualified on the basis of
training or experience, the court shall consider whether, at the time
the claim arose or at the time the testimony is given, the witness
is board certified or has other substantial training or experience in
an area of medical practice relevant to the claim and is actively
practicing in that area.311 
The legislative revision of § 9:2794(D)(3) should provide:
In determining whether a witness is qualified on the basis of
training or experience, the court shall consider, as the deciding
306. See Shadrick v. Grana, 279 So. 3d 553 (Ala. 2018); Sherrer v. Embry,
983 So. 2d 79, 82–83 (Ala. 2007); see also Woodard v. Custard, 719 N.W.2d 828,
860 (Mich. 2006); Robins v. Garg, 714 N.W.2d 49, 54–55 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
307. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2019); ALA. CODE § 6-
5-548 (2019); see also Shadrick, 279 So. 3d 553; Sherrer, 983 So. 2d at 82–83;
Woodard, 719 N.W.2d at 860.
308. See, e.g., Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2018).
309. See discussion supra Part III.C.
310. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (2018); Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d
13, 17–18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017). But see Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So.
3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014).
311. LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018).
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2021] COMMENT 1515
factor, whether, at the time the claim arose or at the time the
testimony is given, the witness is actively practicing in, or has
within five years prior to the date of the alleged malpractice
actively practiced in, the same field of medical practice as the
defendant healthcare provider.312 
(a) If a plaintiff is unable to locate a witness qualified under the
requirements of this section to testify, the court, upon receipt of
an affidavit in compliance with subsection (b), may permit
testimony from a witness in a different field of medical practice
than the defendant upon a showing of the witness’s substantial
familiarity with the applicable standards of care.313 
(b) The plaintiff shall submit a sworn affidavit, executed by the 
plaintiff’s attorney, declaring that the attorney made five good
faith attempts to locate a physician in the defendant’s same field
of medical practice and was unable to do so. The affidavit shall
contain the names and fields of medical practice of the physicians
contacted.314 
The proposed legislative revision guarantees that Louisiana trial
judges will require the witness’s field of medicine to match the defendant’s
to meet the requirements of § 9:2794.315 Louisiana courts will no longer
312. See generally id. (emphasis added).
313. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019)
(emphasis added).
314. See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (McKinney 2019) (emphasis
added). New York requires medical malpractice litigants to submit a complaint 
“accompanied by a certificate, executed by the attorney for the plaintiff.” Id. The 
certificate, referred to as a “certificate of merit,” is New York’s equivalent to
Louisiana’s Medical Review Panel. Id.; see discussion supra Part I.A. The 
certificate of merit must provide that the attorney, after consulting “with at least 
one physician . . . who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the
relevant issues involved in the particular action,” has concluded that there is “a
reasonable basis” for filing suit. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a. The certificate may also
state that the attorney was unable “to obtain consultation” with a physician after
making “three separate good faith attempts with three separate physicians.” Id.
New York’s requirements concerning the “certificate of merit” are helpful in
establishing a means through which a Louisiana plaintiff’s attorney may convey
to the court that he or she is unable to locate a witness willing to testify against
the defendant healthcare provider. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3)
(2018).
315. See Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31–32 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18; Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. &
Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369, 376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007).
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1516 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
have discretion to depart from the statute’s standards.316 The revision
prevents courts from finding, as they have under the current language of §
9:2794, that a witness qualifies as an expert based on an overlap between
his practice area and that of the defendant or based only on his claimed
knowledge of the defendant’s field of medicine, unless the facts of a
particular case necessitate the application of the revision’s exception.317 
Some scholars oppose the restriction on plaintiff’s attorneys retaining
experts in a different field of medicine than the defendant318 because it is
often difficult to locate any physician willing to testify against a fellow
healthcare provider, which makes it more difficult to find a physician 
practicing in the defendant’s same field of medicine.319 Further, scholars
argue that physicians are hesitant to testify that a fellow doctor breached
the standard of care due to a “conspiracy of silence” advanced among
members of the medical profession.320 In small communities, a physician
may be hesitant to testify because he is personally acquainted with the
defendant-physician.321 Physicians often believe that most medical
malpractice claims are frivolous and are filed by plaintiff’s attorneys
focused only on personal financial gain.322 Doctors feel also that they will
be ostracized by fellow healthcare providers if they agree to testify against
a fellow physician.323 
The proposed legislative revision of § 9:2794(D)(3), however,
balances the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.324 In protecting
defendants from testimony by a witness who does not have training in the
defendant’s field of medical practice, the revision of the statute would also
ease the burden on plaintiffs faced with a “conspiracy of silence” when
seeking to locate an expert witness.325 Since a medical malpractice claim,
on average, costs nearly $50,000 to prepare, the statute’s revision would
benefit plaintiffs in ensuring that they are not forced to incur additional
expenses litigating needless disputes surrounding expert witness
316. See Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2018); Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012);
Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir 2014).
317. See Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64; Harper, 86 So. 3d at 696.
318. See generally Arntz, supra note 34, at 1379–80.





324. See discussion infra Part III.
325. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018); Arntz, supra note
34, at 1379–80.
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2021] COMMENT 1517
qualification.326 Although Alabama and Michigan both require that the
witness practice in the defendant’s field of medicine in the year prior to
the date of the alleged malpractice, the revision of § 9:2794(D)(3) would
allow a witness who does not actively practice in the defendant’s same
field of medicine to testify as an expert if the witness has within five years
prior to the date of the alleged malpractice practiced in that field.327 
Based on the low number of active physicians in Louisiana in
comparison to other states, the revision’s five-year period is especially
necessary in ensuring that medical malpractice plaintiffs are not left unable
to find a qualified expert.328 Michigan’s § 600.2169 provides that the
witness must have practiced the defendant’s same field of medicine within
the year prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.329 Imposing the same
requirement in Louisiana would make it more difficult for litigants to find
a qualified expert witness.330 According to a report issued by the 
Association of American Medical Colleges, there are only 12,132 active
physicians in the state of Louisiana, and the report’s definition of “active
physician” includes those not practicing in direct patient care but engaged
in other activities such as medical teaching and research.331 Michigan has
more than double that amount—28,692 active physicians as of 2018.332 As
there are much fewer active physicians in Louisiana than in Michigan,
Louisiana litigants may be left without a qualified expert if they were
forced to locate a physician who has practiced in the defendant’s field of
medicine within the year prior to the alleged malpractice.333 In Alabama,
the same one-year requirement exists, and there are even fewer active
physicians than in Louisiana—10,614 as of 2018.334 For Louisiana
litigants, § 9:2794(D)(3)’s revision will guarantee the clarity and
consistency, in expert witness qualification, that litigants in Michigan and 
326. See Peeples & Harris, supra note 10, at 710–12.
327. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2019); ALA. CODE § 6-5-548
(2019); see discussion supra Part III.
328. See 2019 State Physician Workforce Data Report, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES 1, 8 (2019) https://store.aamc.org/downloadable/
download/sample/sample_id/305/ [https://perma.cc/BPV2-EXUP].
329. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169.
330. See 2019 State Physician Workforce Data Report, supra note 328.
331. See id. at 8. The report’s definition of active physician includes those
engaged in “direct patient care, administration, medical teaching, research, or
other nonpatient care activities.” Id. at 2.
332. See id. at 8.
333. See id. at 8; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2019).
334. See 2019 State Physician Workforce Data Report, supra note 328, at 8;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169.
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1518 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Alabama already experience.335 The proposed revision draws on Michigan
and Alabama’s expert witness statutes to ensure that Louisiana courts issue
uniform decisions on expert witness qualification in medical
malpractice.336 The five-year period, however, eases the burden that
plaintiffs in Alabama and Michigan face in retaining an expert witness.337 
Under the current language of § 9:2794(D)(2), medical school
professors may also qualify as expert witnesses under the revision of
§ 9:2794(D)(3).338 Section 9:2794(D)(2) defines “medical practice” as
training residents or students at an accredited medical school.339 Thus, if a
witness does not actively treat patients, the revision of § 9:2794(D)(3) does
not automatically preclude the witness from testifying as an expert.340 The
witness may still qualify as an expert if he teaches students or residents at
an accredited medical school, as long as he teaches the “same field of
medical practice as the defendant healthcare provider.”341 Even if that
witness does not actively teach the defendant’s same field of medical
practice, he will still be deemed an expert if he has taught the defendant’s
field within the five years prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.342 
In some instances, a plaintiff may not be able to retain an expert
witness that is either: (1) actively practicing in or teaching the defendant’s
field or (2) that has actively practiced in or taught the defendant’s field
within five years prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.343 If such a 
situation arises, the revision of § 9:2794(D)(3) articulates a narrow, but
necessary, exception to its requirement that the witness’s field of medicine
match the defendant’s.344 The exception provides that a plaintiff unable to
find a qualified expert must submit a sworn affidavit, executed by the
plaintiff’s attorney, declaring that the attorney made five good faith
attempts to locate a physician in the defendant’s same field of medical
practice and was unable to do so.345 The affidavit must contain the names 
335. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.2169; ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
336. See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169; ALA. CODE § 6-5-
548.
337. See Arntz, supra note 34, at 1379–80.
338. LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(2). See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(3).
339. Id. § 9:2794(D)(2).
340. Id.
341. Id. See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018).
342. Id. § 9:2794(D)(2). See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(3).
343. See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(2)–(3); Arntz, supra note 34, at 1379–80.
344. See generally LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(3).
345. See generally id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (McKinney 2019).
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and medical fields of the physicians the attorney contacted.346 After 
receiving the affidavit, the court may allow a witness from a different field
of medicine to testify, if the witness is substantially familiar with the
standards of care applicable to the case at bar.347 
The proposed revision’s requirement that the plaintiff’s attorney
submit a certificate containing the names and fields of practice of the
physicians contacted exists to protect defendants against an abuse of the 
exception.348 Absent written proof of an attorney’s thorough search for a
witness, the exception could be utilized as a means to shirk the main
requirement of § 9:2794(D)(3)’s revision: that the witness be a member of
the defendant’s same field of medical practice.349 In addition, the
exception uses standards currently present and successful under Colorado 
law to assist plaintiffs who have conducted an exhaustive, yet
unsuccessful, search for a witness in the defendant’s same field of medical
practice.350 Through submission of the certificate, a plaintiff may offer
testimony from a witness in a different field than the defendant upon a
showing of the witness’s substantial familiarity with the applicable
standards of care.351 Although expert witness qualification is rarely
disputed in Colorado’s medical malpractice suits,352 the Louisiana 
Legislature’s adoption of Colorado’s standard of “substantial
familiarity”353 as a general rule would create further ambiguity concerning
expert witness testimony, an issue frequently and inconsistently decided
by Louisiana courts.354 Used as a narrow exception, however, Colorado’s
346. See generally LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a.
347. See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019).
348. See generally LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a.
349. See generally id. § 9:2794(D)(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2169
(West 2019); ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2019).
350. See generally LA. REV. STAT § 9:2794(D)(2)–(3); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-64-401; Arntz, supra note 34, at 1379–80.
351. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-64-401.
352. A Westlaw search of “13-64-401” shows only 20 cases that have cited the 
statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019).
353. See id.
354. See Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181 So. 3d 26, 31–32 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015); Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2017); Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369, 376 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th Cir. 2007). But see Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58,
64 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2018); Harper v. Minor, 86 So. 3d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2012); Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 684–85 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2014).
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1520 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
standard is useful to ensure that a witness, although a member of a
different field of medicine than the defendant, is still knowledgeable of the
applicable standards of care.355 
The most efficient way to demonstrate expert witness qualification
under § 9:2794(D)(3)’s revision is to apply the language of the revision to 
a case previously discussed in this Comment.356 In Kieffer v. Plunkett-
Kuspa, the plaintiff filed suit against an internist.357 To qualify as an expert
under the statute’s revision, the plaintiff’s witness must practice medicine
“in the same field of medical practice” as the defendant.358 Thus, because
the defendant practices as an internist, the plaintiff’s witness must also
actively practice as a specialist in internal medicine.359 If the plaintiff’s
witness does not actively practice in that field, the witness is not
necessarily prevented from testifying as an expert.360 The witness still
qualifies as an expert if he teaches internal medicine to students or
residents at an accredited medical school.361 In addition, a court will also 
find a witness to be an expert if he has either practiced or taught internal
medicine within five years prior to the date of the alleged malpractice.362 
If a plaintiff still is unable to locate an internist willing to testify, the
plaintiff’s attorney can execute and submit a sworn affidavit stating that
the attorney made five good faith attempts to locate an internist and was
unable to do so.363 The affidavit must contain the names and fields of
medical practice of the physicians whom the attorney contacted.364 The 
court may then permit testimony from a witness practicing in a field other
than internal medicine, upon a showing of that witness’s substantial
familiarity with the standard of care applicable to an internist.365 
The proposed legislative revision of § 9:2794 will provide clarity to
Louisiana medical malpractice litigants.366 Courts will no longer issue
355. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-40; LA. REV. STAT. § 
9:2794(D)(3).
356. See discussion supra Part II.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 310–14. 
357. See discussion supra Part II.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
358. See discussion supra Part II.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
359. See discussion supra Part II.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a 
(McKinney 2019).
365. See discussion supra Part III.C.; supra text accompanying notes 310–14; 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019).
366. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  413 5/26/21  11:50 AM







    
    




      
    
   
   
  
   
  
  





       
       
       
 
      
   
 
   
 
      
     
    
 
          
      
    
  
         
  
2021] COMMENT 1521
inconsistent decisions as to who qualifies as an a medical-expert
witness.367 Instead, the statute’s revised language will guarantee that a
witness’s field of medicine matches the defendant’s, and courts will issue
uniform, consistent rulings on expert witness testimony.368 Additionally,
the fears of opponents of a stricter standard are mitigated, as the revision
will ensure that a plaintiff asserting a claim for medical malpractice is not
left unable to locate a qualified expert.369 
CONCLUSION
The factfinder’s great discretion in evaluating conflicting expert
witness testimony and the necessity of the expert in medical malpractice
actions make the determination of whether a witness is qualified an
important one.370 Medical malpractice claims are costly for plaintiffs and
defendants alike.371 Section 9:2794’s current language forces plaintiffs to
expend additional resources litigating expert witness qualification, not the
merits of the case at bar.372 Defendants under the current statute face 
damaging testimony from witnesses who hold themselves out as experts
in the defendant’s field of medicine based solely on their claimed 
knowledge of that field.373 Courts admit other witnesses as experts due to 
the witnesses’ arguments that an overlap exists between their field and the
defendant’s.374 Courts should no longer have unbridled discretion to depart
from § 9:2794 in establishing expert witness qualification.375 Under the
revised language of § 9:2794(D)(3), courts will not deem a witness
367. See discussion supra Part II.
368. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 310–14; Arntz, supra note 34, at
1379–80.
370. See Morris v. Rainwater, 218 So. 3d 226, 235 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017)
(finding that where it is possible that “reasonable minds could disagree regarding
the evidence presented . . . the jury was not clearly wrong in choosing to believe
one side’s expert over the other”); see also Schultz v. Guoth, 57 So. 3d 1002 (La.
2011).
371. Peeples & Harris, supra note 10, at 710–12.
372. See generally id.; Lee v. Quinn, 229 So. 2d 13, 18 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2017); Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 245 So. 3d 58, 64 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2018).
373. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D); Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64.
374. See Kieffer v. Plunkett-Kuspa, 138 So. 3d 682, 686–88 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2014); Pertuit v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Service Dist. No. 2, 170 So. 3d 1106,
1110 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015).
375. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D); Pennington, 245 So. 3d at 64;
Kieffer, 138 So. 3d at 686–88.
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1522 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
qualified as an expert to testify that a defendant healthcare provider
breached the standard of care owed by members of the defendant’s field
of medicine unless the witness actually practices medicine, teaches
medical students, or has, within five years prior, practiced or taught in that
same field.376 In any event, the revision prevents plaintiffs from being left
without a qualified expert.377 Where a plaintiff is unsuccessful in his search 
for an expert witness, Louisiana courts may then permit testimony from
an expert substantially familiar with the applicable standards of care.378 
The Louisiana Legislature must reject the “let it all in philosophy” once
and for all, and revise Louisiana Revised Statues § 9:2794 to hold expert
witness qualification to a uniform standard.379 
376. See generally Franklin v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 972 So. 2d 369,
376 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007); Penn v. CarePoint Partners of La., L.L.C., 181
So. 3d 26, 31–32 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015); Lee, 229 So. 2d at 18.
377. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3); Arntz, supra note 34, at
1379–80.
378. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(D)(3) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-64-401 (West 2019); Arntz, supra note 34, at 1379–80.
379. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794; see also In re Air Crash Disaster
at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1233–34 (5th Cir. 1986).
